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EQUAL PROTECTION: ANALYZING THE
DIMENSIONS OF A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTTHE RIGHT TO VOTE
The purpose of this comment is to examine the fundamental right to vote, perhaps more appropriately termed political
participation rights, I and the Supreme Court's analysis of how
that right may be limited. First, the general conceptual framework of equal protection will be examined; second, the comment will explore the Supreme Court's method of assessing the
dimensions of the voting right in the context of its two tier
equal protection test; and third, an attempt will be made to
suggest a theoretical framework which would provide a more
flexible and logical approach to political participation rights.
EQUAL PROTECTION

The Two Tier Test
The Court has two different standards of review that it can
apply to a legislative classification: strict scrutiny and minimum scrutiny. Simply stated, if you are able to persuade the
Court that the classification is "suspect" or that it impairs a
"fundamental right," the law will be reviewed, and in practice
struck down, under the strict scrutiny/compelling state interest
test. Otherwise, the Court will employ the rational relationship
test which requires the state's classification to be related to
some legitimate state purpose, and in practice ratifies the legislative scheme.2
Under the two tier equal protection formula the initial
1. The Court has indicated in dictum that the right to vote is not, per se, a
constitutionally protected right. Rather, what the right to vote encompasses is the right
to participate in elections on an equal basis with other qualified voters whenever the
State has adopted an elective process for determining who will represent any segment
of the state's population. San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S.
1, 35 n.78 (1973).
The Court's definition of the right to vote may be an attempt to explain why it
does not review restrictions with respect to age or citizenship. In any event this comment will use the "right to vote" and "political participation rights" interchangeably
to express the Court's definition.
2. Mr. Justice Harlan held the view that the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment was not the proper constitutional basis for a determination of
fundamental rights. Rather, he believed that the legislative enactment should be
voided only if it violated the basic values implicit in the concept of ordered liberty
under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 479, 500 (1965) (concurring opinion).
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question in determining the use of the compelling state interest
test is whether the classification is "suspect" or impairs a "fundamental right." The standard for "suspectness" is whether
the law discriminates against a distinct and insular minority.3
The Court has found "suspect" classifications which label
groups according to race4 and alienage.5 Further, the Court has
indicated that laws which classify by sex6 or illegitimacy' are
subject to close inspection, although the net effect of decisions
in these areas is to leave such classifications out of the province
of the strict scrutiny-compelling state interest standard. The
method of identifying fundamental rights not specifically enumerated in the Constitution is not clear, but apparently turns
on whether the Court believes that such a right is implicit in
the Constitution." Thus, the Court has viewed the Constitution
3. Mr. Justice Stone first introduced the standard in 1938: "whether prejudice
against discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition, which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied on to
protect minorities, and which may call for correspondingly more searching judicial
inquiry." United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938).
One commentator has suggested a model for determining a "suspect" classification: (1) Is the group discrete and insular, thus subject to political injury actually
caused by the statute? (2) Has the group been stigmatized in the past so that it is
subject to psychological injury, and is such injury caused by the statute? (3) Are the
distinguishing characteristics of the group congenital and immutable so that the group
is vulnerable to "unfair penalty," and is such penalty imposed by the statute? Note,
A Question of Balance: Statutory Classifications Under the Equal Protection Clause,
26 STAN. L. REV. 155, 163-64 (1973).
In San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973), the
Supreme Court reiterated the discrete and insular minority standard by noting that
classifications based on group characteristics would trigger the strict scrutinycompelling state interest standard when that group was saddled "with such disabilities, or subjected to such a history of purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated to
such a position of political powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection from
the majoritarian political process." Id. at 28.
4. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
5. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971); see Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong,
96 S.Ct. 1895 (1976).
6. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971). In Craig v. Boren, 97 S. Ct. 451 (1976), the
United States Supreme Court per Mr. Justice Brennan invalidated an Oklahoma law
which prohibited sale of 3.2% beer to males under 21 and to females under 18 on the
ground that Oklahoma's gender-based differential constituted an invidious discrimination against males 18-20 years of age in violation of the equal protection clause. The
Court in reaching its decision used a middle level of scrutiny: "To withstand constitutional challenge, previous cases establish that classifications by gender must serve
important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to achievement
of those objectives." Id. at 457. See also Califano v. Goldfarb, 45 U.S.L.W. 4237 (Mar.
2, 1977).
7. Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972).
8. Mr. Justice Powell in examining the question of whether education was a
fundamental right noted:
The key to discovering whether education is "fundamental" is not to be
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as guaranteeing these "fundamental rights:" the right to privacy,I the right to vote,'" the right to interstate travel," and the
right of access to the criminal justice system.'2 The Court has3
refused to label as fundamental, claims involving housing,'
welfare," education, 5 or economic regulation," with the result
that these areas are left to the discretion of state legislatures.
A Middle Level Scrutiny
The rigidity of the Court's two tier system has led commentators to suggest a more flexible approach.' 7 Most notably,
Professor Gerald Gunther has proposed that the Court address
itself to whether the legislative classification is in fact substantially related to the purpose of the statute-a means focus
test.' Such an appraoch would not result in the Court exercising complete deference to the legislature, but rather it would
have the Court assess the legislation (the means) in terms of
the legislative purpose to determine whether it substantially
furthers the legislative purpose. Such a furtherance would have
to have a basis in reality, not merely conjecture.'" One promifound in comparisons of the relative societal significance of education as
opposed to subsistence or housing. Nor is it to be found by weighing
whether education is as important as the right to travel. Rather, the
answer lies in assessing whether there is a right to education explicitly or
implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution.
San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 33-34 (1973).
Apparently, the substantive constitutional underpinning of the right to vote is the
equal protection clause. Id. at 59 n.2 (Stewart, J., concurring).
9. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
10. Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621 (1969).
11. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
12. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963). But cf. Ross v. Moffit, 417 U.S.
600 (1974).
13. Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972).
14. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1972).
15. San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
16. See generally New Orleans v. Dukes, 96 S.Ct. 2513 (1976).
17. Nowak, Realigning the Standards of Review Under the Equal Protection
Guarantee-Prohibited,Neutral, and Permissive Classifications, 62 GEo. L.J. 1071
(1974); see Wilkinson, The Supreme Court, the Equal Protection Clause, and the
Three Faces of Constitutional Equality, 61 VA. L. REV. 945 (1975); Comment, The
Mandate for a New Equal Protection Model, 24 CATH. L. REV. 558 (1975); Note,
Legislative Purpose, Rationality, and Equal Protection, 82 YALE L.J. 123 (1972).
18. Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Foreword:In Search of Evolving
Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection,86 HARv. L.
REV. 1, 20 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Gunther].
19. Gunther, supra note 18, at 21. Chief Justice Earl Warren in McDonald v.
Board of Election Comm'rs, 394 U.S. 802 (1969), indicated the type of deference to be
accorded to the legislature under the rational relationship test: "Legislatures are presumed to have acted constitutionally even if the source materials normally resorted to
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nent example of where the Court attempted to use such a middle level approach was in Eisenstadt v. Baird.'"In Eisenstadt
the Court voided a Massachusetts law which made it a felony
for anyone to give away or sell contraceptives to unmarried
individuals. Mr. Justice Brennan refused to directly extend the
Griswold right to privacy rationale,' which would have triggered the compelling state interest test."2 Instead, he noted that
if one viewed the legislation as a health measure, the inclusion
of all contraceptives in the statute was overbroad since not all
contraceptives are potentially dangerous.23 Although he purported to use the rational relationship test, 4 it was obvious that
a stricter level of scrutiny was being employed since the Court
did not give as much deference to the legislature as usual.
Hopes that the Court would articulate Gunther's meansfocus test, or at least some balancing approach 5 to equal protection problems, were dashed in San Antonio Independent
School District v. Rodriquez. There the Court affirmed its adfor ascertaining their grounds for action are otherwise silent, and their statutory classifications will be set aside only if no grounds can be conceived to justify them." Id. at
809.
20. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
21. In Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), the Court invalidated a
Connecticut statute which prohibited the distribution of contraceptives to anyone.
22. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 447 n.7 (1972).
23. Id. at 451-52. Mr. Justice Brennan, in addition to rejecting health considerations as a purpose of the statute, also found that deterrence of premarital sex could
not "reasonably be regarded as the purpose of the Massachusetts law." Id. at 448-50.
He then indicated that the purpose of the statute was a prohibition on contraception
and, as such, was unconstitutional. Mr. Justice Brennan stopped short of using the
Griswold compelling state interest test for voiding the statute, yet the actual standard
of scrutiny which he used was unclear.
While praising Mr. Justice Brennan's avoidance of the deferential approach to
state legislation, Professor Gunther felt that the Justice overshot the mark of his
means-focus test by rejecting purposes offered by the state:
Justice Brennan's rejection of the antifornication and health purposes
carried concentration on actual state objectives much further than the
model would suggest. Indeed, it undercuts the model in a fundamental
way. A peremptory rejection of proffered state purposes strongly suggests
a value-laden appraisal of the legitimacy of ends. The two disbelieved
purposes had been offered by the State and explained by the state courts.
Intensified rationality scrutiny justifies focus on actual purpose rather
than court-conceived ones; it does not justify rejecting several properly
offered state objectives in the interest of molding the controversy into an
equal protection violation.
Gunther, supra note 18, at 35-36.
24. 405 U.S. at 447.
25. Mr. Justice Marshall had proposed a balancing test, but such a formulation
was rejected. San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 102-03
(1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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herence to the two tier model by rejecting any claims that the
right to an education was implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution."6 The Court distinguished Eisenstadt apparently by
concluding that the correct form of equal protection analysis in
that case was the compelling state interest standard."
Analyzing a Fundamental Right
While the question of determining which classifications
should be labelled as "suspect" or as imparing a "fundamental
right" is certainly important and has generated much debate,2"
such a discusssion is beyond the scope of this comment.
Rather, the focus will be on the question of how the Court
should treat a right that already has been declared fundamental. In practice, the use of the compelling state interest test
invalidates all restrictions on a fundamental right since the
state's burden in justifying such a restriction is very heavy.'
Such an approach to the compelling state interest test is tantamount to declaring that a "fundamental right" enjoys absolute
protection under the fourteenth amendment. Obviously, such
a result is unworkable. Absent the absoluteness of a fundamental right, theoretical adherence to a compelling state interest
test is ill-suited for determining the dimensions of the right to
vote. Since the use of the rational relationship test has, in
practice, traditionally meant complete deference to the legislature, this test also is not a satisfactory model in which to analyze a fundamental right.
It is with this conceptual problem in mind that the Supreme Court's analysis of the fundamental right to vote would
be appropriate.
THE SUPREME COURT'S TREATMENT OF THE
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO VOTE

Although subject to exceptions, the Supreme Court's deci26. 411 U.S. 1, 35 (1973).
27. Id. at 34 n.7.
28. See note 17 supra.
29. In Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972), Chief Justice Warren Burger
objected to the majority's use of the compelling state interest test in voiding a one year
voting residency requirement. The Chief Justice stated: "To challenge such lines by
the 'compelling state interest' standard is to condemn them all. So far as I am aware,
no state law has ever satisfied this seemingly insurmountable [standard] and I doubt
one ever will, for it demands nothing less than perfection." Id. at 363-64 (dissenting
opinion).
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sions in the area of political participation rights have generally
fallen into three categories: first, one individual's vote must
have the same weight as another's-one man, one vote;3" second, as many people as possible should have access to the
ballot box; 3' third, minority and third party candidates cannot
per se be kept off the ballot. 2
One Man, One Vote
The first area where the Court has sought to protect the
franchise is with the concept of one man, one vote. Beginning
with its decision in Baker v. Carr, the Court declared that even
though the question of reapportionment was political, judicial
review was appropriate to determine if the legislative action
exceeded constitutional authority.33 The Court was influenced
by the fact that in Baker the vote of an individual in one county
was worth 19 times that of a voter in a different county. 4 Two
years later, Chief Justice Earl Warren, in Reynolds v. Sims,
noted that the right to vote freely for the candidate of one's
choice was the essence of a democratic society, and that that
right could be denied by a dilution of the weight of a citizen's
vote just as effectively as by an outright prohibition. 5 However,
the application of the one man, one vote principle cannot be
neatly summarized since the Court has announced different
guidelines for different types of elections.
Perhaps the clearest rule is that for congressional district
elections, state legislatures are required to draw voting lines,
as nearly as is practicable, so that one man's vote equals another man's vote. While recognizing that exact mathematical
precision is impossible, the Court has struck down as unconstitutional congressional districting plans where there was a variance of 4.13% between a state's two congressional districts (i.e.,
one district being overrepresented by 2.43%, another district
being underrepresented by 1.7%).17 Furthermore, the state
must justify each variance no matter how small, unless the
30. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964). See generally Developments in the
Law-Elections, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1111 (1975).
31. Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621 (1969).
32. William v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968).
33. 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).
34. 369 U.S. at 245 (Douglas, J., concurring).
35. 377 U.S. 533, 555 (1964).
36. Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964).
37. White v. Weiser, 412 U.S. 783 (1973). The variance percentage is arrived at
by adding the underrepresented and overrepresented percentages.
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population variances resulted despite good faith efforts to draw
the lines with precision." The Court, however, will allow state
legislatures to deviate slightly from the general rule in situations where substantial population shifts over a ten year period
can be predicted with a high degree of accuracy39 (for example,
in a fast growing suburban development).
The Court is more flexible with respect to population variances when state legislative districts are involved. Chief Justice Earl Warren stated one of the reasons for this policy:
A consideration that appears to be of more substance in
justifying some deviations from population-based representation in state legislatures is that of insuring some voice
to political subdivisions as political subdivisions. . . . In
many states much of the legislature's activity involves the
enactment of so-called local legislation directed only to the
concerns of the particular political subdivisions."°
The Court has struck down variations for state legislative
districts that have ranged from 30% to 40%,11 but it has upheld
a variation of 16.4%42 by noting that the policy of maintaining
the integrity of political subdivision lines in the process of reapportioning a state legislature is a rational one.' 3 Furthermore,
the Court has said that variations of 9.9% are not sufficient
to make out a prima facie case of invidious discrimination
under the fourteenth amendment so as to require justification
by the state." The numbers which the Court have picked out
seem quite arbitrary, reflecting the Court's wishes that the
litigation stop somewhere.
The test which the Court uses for state legislative districts
is not as stringent a test as the one used for congressional
districts, but state legislatures are not given a completely free
hand. While the Court may indicate that it is using the rational
38. Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526, 531 (1969). In Kirkpatrick the most
populous district was 3.13% above the mathematical ideal, and the least populous was
2.84% below the ideal. Id. at 528-29.
39. Id. at 535. The Kirkpatrick court did not indicate how much of a deviation
would be permissible.
40. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 580 (1964).
41. Swann v. Adams, 385 U.S. 440 (1967).
42. Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315 (1973).
43. Id. at 329.
44. White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1973). In Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S.
735, 749-50 (1973), Mr. Justice White concluded that a 7.83% variation was not sufficient to make out a prima facie case: "That the Court was not deterred by the hazards
of the political thicket when it undertook to adjudicate the reapportionment cases does
not mean that it should become bogged down in a vast, intractable apportionment
slough, particularly when there is little if anything to be accomplished by doing so."
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relationship test, the standard of review is clearly higher than
minimum scrutiny since the Court does not completely defer
to the state legislature as is usual45 when that test is used. The
best summary of the test the Court uses for state legislative
districts is that once a prima facie case of violation of the one
man, one vote principle is established, the state's justifications
must be based on political reality, not mere speculation" (i.e.,
the State must show that the lines are so drawn to maintain
the integrity of political subdivisions).
With respect to the district lines for local elections, the
Court has also insisted on the one man, one vote principle.47
However, the Court has allowed a variance of 11.9%, indicating
that historical patterns in certain cases might be sufficient to
justify some differences.48 Although the Court appears to confine its holdings in this area to the facts of each particular case,
it uses the same flexible test for local elections as it uses for
state reapportionments.
There is an obvious contradiction in using the strict compelling state interest test for congressional reapportionment
and a less stringent test for state and local apportionments.
Since the Court has already declared equality of voting a fundamental right, a State should have to justify any significant
deviations from the one man, one vote principle by a showing
of necessity or compelling state interest.49 Whether or not one
agrees with the policy considerations behind the distinctions,
it is apparent that the Court is only paying lip service to the
two tier equal protection test and in practice is really using an
equal protection approach that turns on the Court's vision of
the needs of a democratic society in a particular situation. 0
45. Whatever the parameters of the word "rational," it is clear that by injecting
itself into this political controversy, the Court is willing on occasions to substitute its
judgment for that of the state legislature's.
46. One commentator has termed this type of formulation "new bite for the old
equal protection." See Gunther, supra note 18, at 20.
47. Hadley v. Junior College Dist., 397 U.S. 50 (1970).
48. Abate v. Mundt, 403 U.S. 182 (1971). In Abate, Mr. Justice Marshall indicated that the Court's decisions in the area of local district apportionment reflected
the view that the particular circumstances and needs of a local community as a whole
sometimes justified departures from strict equality. Id. at 185.
49. The fact that congressional reapportionment is based on Article 1, section 2,
which requires that Representatives be chosen "by the People of the several States"
should not account for the distinction: See generally White v. Regester, 412 U.S. at
777-82 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315, 339-43 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
50. Another example of where the Court has strayed from the one man, one vote
principle is in Gordon v. Lance, 403 U.S. 1 (1971), where a state statute which required
voters to approve bond issues by a 60% super-majority was upheld. It was quite plain
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While one may agree ultimately with the outcome of the cases,
the Court's adherence to the rigid all or nothing equal protection test presents conceptual difficulties in determining the
degree of a permissible variance. Since the right to vote has
been declared a fundamental right, state legislatures in theory
should have to comply with the compelling state interest standard in justifying any significant deviations from the one man,
one vote principle, not merely be allowed to show that the
scheme is rational.
Access to the Ballot Box
The Court has also intervened in protecting voter rights to
insure that as many people as possible have access to the ballot
box. The Court first moved in this direction in 1965 when it
struck down a Texas statute denying military personnel the
right to vote.5 Likewise, the Court declared unconstitutional
Virginia's poll tax by noting that the introduction of wealth by
requiring payment of a fee, as a measure of a voter's qualification was capricious and irrelevant. 2 Neither case clearly articulated a standard of review for cases restricting voter access to
the ballot. Not until Kramer v. Union Free School District did
the Court hold that a state must demonstrate a compelling
state interest to be able to deny a citizen the right to vote.53
In Kramer, the Court struck down a New York statute
which stated that residents who were otherwise qualified to
vote in state and federal elections could do so in school district
elections only if they owned or leased taxable realty or were
parents of children enrolled in the public schools.54 The Court
explained its use of the compelling state interest test this way:
This careful examination is necessary because statutes distributing the franchise constitute the foundation of our
that by requiring such a super-majority voters who favored passage of such a bond issue
had their ballots effectively diluted. However, the Court noted that there was nothing
in the language of the Constitution or the country's history to indicate that the majority had to prevail on every issue. Id. at 6.
51. Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89 (1965).
52. Harper v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
53. 395 U.S. 621, 627 (1969).
54. As a result of this classification the following qualified voters were excluded
from participating in the election: senior citizens living with children or relatives;
clergy, military personnel, and others who lived on tax-exempt property; boarders and
lodgers; parents who neither owned nor leased qualifying property and whose children
were too young to attend school; parents who neither owned nor leased qualifying
property and whose children attended private schools. Id. at 630.
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representative society. Any unjustified discrimination in
determining who may participate in political affairs or in
the selection of public officials undermines the legitimacy
of representative government. 5

In the same decision the Court upheld limitations on the
franchise based on age, residency, and citizenship" without
requiring that they further some compelling state interest. 7
The obvious contradictions of Kramer demonstrate the conceptual difficulty of using the compelling state interest test to
decide the appropriate voter restrictions in a democratic society."8
In spite of this inconsistency, the Court extended the
Kramer rationale by voiding state laws that restricted voting
in bond referenda solely to property owners,5" and denied the
right to vote to residents of a federal enclave. 0 In Hill v. Stone,
the Court invalidated a Texas dual box election procedure
where all the persons-who owned taxable property rendered
for taxation voted in one box and all other voters cast their
ballots in a separate box."A The statute provided that a bond
issue could pass only if it was approved by a majority vote in
both the renderers' box and in the aggregate of both boxes. The
effect of this mechanism was that nonrenderers could defeat a
bond issue but they could not pass it."2 The state argued that
the rendering of property to vote in a bond election facilitated
55. Id. at 626.
56. Id. at 625.
57. One commentator in discussing the Kramer decision has noted:
A voter qualification, regardless of the sub-category to which it is assigned, is still a voter qualification. Mr. Kramer was prevented from
voting because he was neither a parent nor an owner or lessee of property.
Other persons are prevented from voting for other reasons, even though
it must be conceded that, at least to some of them, their interests in the
election are greater than Mr. Kramer's . . . . The individual comparisons that inevitably result when the reasonableness standard of equal
protection are discarded in favor of compelling state interest are impossible to implement on a case-by-case basis.
Lee, Mr. Herbert Spencer and the Bachelor Stockbroker: Kramer v. Union Free School
District No. 15, 15 ARIz. L. REV. 457, 467-68 (1973).
58. The Court in 1973, apparently recognizing this dilemma, redefined the right
to vote by noting that it is the right to participate in state elections on an equal basis
with other qualified voters whenever the state has adopted an elective process for
determining who will represent any segment of the state's population. San Antonio
Independent School Dist. v. Rodriquez, 411 U.S. 1, 35 n.78 (1973).
59. City of Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, 399 U.S. 204 (1970).
60. Evans v. Cornman, 398 U.S. 419 (1970).
61. 421 U.S. 289 (1975).
62. Id. at 293 n.3.
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the enforcement of the state's revenue laws, but Mr. Justice
Marshall, writing for the Court, noted that the use of the franchise to compel compliance with other, independent state
objectives was questionable in any context. 3
However, there have been occasions when the Court has
refused to use the compelling state interest test and has upheld
restrictions limiting access to the ballot box. The first case to
do so was Rosario v. Rockefeller.64 In Rosario the Court upheld
a New York statute that required a voter to enroll in the party
of his choice at least 30 days before the general election in order
to be eligible to vote in the next primary. Thus, the cutoff for
enrollment was approximately eight months prior to a Presidential primary (held in June) and eleven months prior to a
nonpresidential primary (held in September). The Court distinguished Kramer, stating that the New York law did not
absolutely disenfranchise any voter, but merely imposed a time
deadline to be eligible to vote in a party primary. 5 While conceding that the period between the enrollment deadline and
the next primary was lengthy, 6 the Court concluded that insuring the integrity of the electoral process by preventing ballot
raiding was a legitimate and valid state goal. 7 The Court did
not explain why it failed to apply the compelling state interest
test or why New York should not be required to use less drastic
means to prevent raiding, such as providing a shorter period
between the enrollment deadline and the next primary. Mr.
Justice Powell, in dissent, attacked the majority's opinion by
saying:
The majority does not identify the standard of scrutiny it
applies to the New York statute. We are told only that the
cutoff is "not an arbitrary time limit unconnected to any
important state goal;" that it is "tied to a particularized
63. Id. at 299. In fact, the rendering requirement may have, in effect, created a
property-related classification. Because of the structure of the Texas property tax
system, those with realty and business are automatically eligible to vote as renderers,
while other voters must take the somewhat unusual step of voluntarily rendering their
property for taxation. Id. at 298 n.7.
64. 410 U.S. 752 (1973).
65. Id. at 757. The statute provided a long list of exemptions, most prominent
of which were for persons too ill to enroll and newly arrived residents. Id. at 754 n.3.
66. Id. at 760. Under New York law, a voter who wishes to switch parties is
required to enroll in the new political party between the prior primary and the October
cutoff date (i.e., one month before the general election).
67. Id. at 761. The raiding which the New York statute was designed to prevent
is when members of one party vote in the primary of another party for a candidate
whom they consider to be the weaker opponent for the general election.

174
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legitimate purpose and is in no sense invidious or arbitrary." The Court does not explain why this formulation
was chosen, what precedents support it, or how and in
what context it is to be applied. Such nebulous promulgations are bound to leave lower courts and state legislatures
in doubt and confusion as to how we will approach future
significant burdens on the right to vote and to associate
freely with the party of one's choice. 8
Kusper v. Pontikes,0 decided the same term as Rosario,
added to the confusion surrounding the Rosario decision. In
Kusper the Court declared unconstitutional an Illinois law
which prohibited a person from voting in the primary election
of a political party if he had voted in the primary of any other
party within the preceding 23 months. The Court distinguished
Rosario on the grounds that the Illinois statute locked a voter
into a pre-existing party affiliation from one primary to the
next, and the only way to break that lock was to forego voting
in any primary for a period of almost two years.70 In both
Rosario and Kusper the statutes affected the voters' rights in
a significant way, yet one law was allowed to stand and the
other was struck down. In Rosario the Court used the rational
relationship test to uphold the restriction, but the test used in
Kusper, although framed in first amendment language, seemed
to approach the stricter compelling state interest standard:
As our past decisions have made clear, a significant encroachment upon associational freedom cannot be justified
upon a mere showing of a legitimate state interest. If the
state has open, to it a less drastic way of satisfying its
legitimate interests, it may not choose a legislative scheme
that broadly stifles the exercise of fundamental personal
liberties.7
Another decision which applied the rational relationship
test was Salyer Land Company v. Tulare Lake Basin Water
72 Salyer involved
Storage District.
a California water storage
district statute which allowed only land owners to vote. The
68. Id. at 767 (Powell, J., dissenting).
69. 414 U.S. 51 (1973).
70. Id. at 60-61.
71. Id. at 58-59. Again, one may ask why Illinois had to choose a less drastic
means of regulating access to the ballot box while New York did not. The explanation
that Kusper is based on the first amendment does not alter the fact that in Rosario a
significant burden was also placed on political association.
72. 410 U.S. 719 (1973).
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franchise was extended to individual and corporate land owners whether or not they resided in the district, and the vote was
weighted according to the voter's land assessment. The Court
upheld these restrictions by indicating that Kramer had left
open the question of whether the state in some circumstances
might limit the exercise of the franchise to those primarily
interested or primarily affected.73 The Court believed that this
special election district should be made an exception to the
Kramer rule because the district's primary purpose was limited
to water storage and distribution and the district performed no
other general public services of the type ordinarily financed by
a municipal body.74 It is important to note, however, that the
water storage district performed an important governmental
function in regulating land control and water distribution. The
district's decisions in these areas significantly affected all residents, not just land owners. Salyer is, therefore, inconsistent
with the attempt in Kramer to encourage greater voter participation.
In summary, the Court has proclaimed voting a fundamental right and has used the compelling state interest test to
insure that as many people as possible have access to the ballot
box,7" but the test has not been uniformly applied and the
Court has upheld as reasonable under the rational relationship
test significant state restrictions on the franchise. The major
problem with this approach is that it fosters judicial inconsistency. On the one hand, the Supreme Court tells us that voter
access to the ballot box is fundamental and, therefore, only the
compelling state interest test should be used. On other occasions we are told that certain restrictions on this fundamental
right are valid not because they meet the compelling state
interest standard, but because they have a rational basis. Such
an arbitrary choice in picking the standard of review to test the
validity of such restrictions highlights the inadequacy of the
73. Id. at 726-28.
74. Id. at 728-29.
75. The Court has dealt with residency requirements and with absentee ballots
for prisoners who were entitled to vote. In Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972),
the Court used the compelling state interest test to void a one-year residency requirement and suggested that a 30-day limitation would be sufficient. Id. at 347. However,
in Marston v. Lewis, 410 U.S. 679 (1973), a 50-day residency requirement was upheld.
With respect to providing absentee ballots for prisoners, the Court has held that
the State has an affirmative obligation to provide for such ballots. O'Brien v. Skinner,
414 U.S. 524 (1974). In Skinner Chief Justice Warren Burger, writing for the majority,
did not indicate what level of scrutiny was used in arriving at the decison.
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two tier equal protection approach in evaluating a fundamental
right.
Right to a Place on the Ballot
The Court also has sought to protect independent and
third-party candidates seeking to have their names placed on
the ballot. The Court began to move in this direction in 1968
with the decision of Williams v. Rhodes.7" At issue in Williams
was an Ohio statute which provided that in order for an independent presidential candidate to be listed on the ballot in a
general election, the candidate had to file petitions with signatures of 15% of the electorate on February 15th of the election
year. Mr. Justice Black, writing for the Court, used the compelling state interest test to void the law and noted that the statute placed a burden on the right to political association and the
right of qualified voters to cast an effective ballot."
In Jenness v. Fortson, the Court upheld a statute which
imposed a less restrictive filing date (the second week in June)
and required independent candidates to present petitions
signed by five percent of all eligible voters.7" The Court did not
indicate which test it was using, but the state was not required
to present compelling reasons to justify the restrictions.7"
The Court in Bullock v. Carterstruck down state filing fees
for party primary elections which ranged as high as $8,900.0
Recently, in Lubin v. Panish, a California statute was declared
unconstitutional as denying indigents access to the ballot
through the use of filing fees. 8' Although the statute in Lubin
was voided, the Court did not use the compelling state interest
standard. Instead, Chief Justice Warren Burger said: "Selection of candidates solely on the basis of ability to pay a fixed
fee without providing any alternative means is not reasonably
76. 393 U.S. 23 (1968).
77. Id. at 30-31. Mr. Justice Black stated: "The State here has failed to show
any compelling interest which justifies imposing such heavy burdens on the right to
vote and associate." Id. at 31.
78. 403 U.S. 431 (1971).
79. In another decision which involved percentage requirements for nominating
petitions, the Court struck down an Illinois statute which required independent candidates to gather 25,000 signatures from each of at least 50 of the state's 102 counties.
Moore v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 814 (1969). Again, the Court did not indicate what test it
was using, but merely noted that the law applied a rigid, arbitrary formula to sparsely
settled counties and populous counties alike. Id. at 818.
80. 405 U.S. 134 (1972).
81. 415 U.S. 709 (1974).
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necessary to the accomplishment of the State's legitimate elec82
tion interests."
The difficulty which the Court is faced with in providing
greater access to the ballot is that it must contend with two
competing objectives. One objective is that the people should
be given an opportunity to vote for a candidate who closely
approximates their own view. However, a state has a substantial interest in promoting compromise, in attempting to insure
that an election winner will represent a majority of the community, and in providing the electorate with a comprehensible
ballot in order to maintain political stability. 3
The current rigid equal protection formula is ill-suited to
determine at what point state restrictions on candidate access
to the ballot becomes unacceptable. Mr. Justice White recognized this dilemma when he stated in Storer v. Brown:
It is very unlikely that all or even a large portion of the
state election laws would fail to pass muster under our
cases; and the rule fashioned by the Court to pass on constitutional challenges to specific provisions of election laws
provides no litmus-paper test for separating those restrictions that are valid from those that are invidious under the
Equal Protection Clause. The rule is not self-executing and
is no substitute for the hard judgments that must be
made. 4
Summary of the Court's Analysis
Although the Court maintains that it is adhering to the
two tier equal protection test, the decisions dealing with political participation rights reflect a desire to use a less rigid balancing approach in analyzing the parameters of this fundamental right. In some instances we have seen the Court use the
compelling state interest test, in some decisions the rational
relationship test, and in a few cases the level of scrutiny is not
identified. The Court has failed to articulate a consistent standard in evaluating this fundamental right. It is with this conceptual problem in mind that a discussion of fashioning a more
82. Id. at 718. In a concurring opinion Mr. Justice Douglas said that the appropriate standard of review was the compelling state interest test. Id. at 722.
83. Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 729 (1974).
84. Id. at 730. In Storer, the Court upheld a California provision which required
a one year disaffiliation from a political party in order for an independent candidate
to run for office. See note 88, infra. In a case decided the same day as Storer, the Court
upheld Texas' scheme limiting the way individuals can get their names placed before
the electorate. American Party of Texas v. White, 415 U.S. 767 (1974).
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flexible equal protection test for the evaluation of a fundamental right becomes appropriate.

A

MORE FLEXIBLE APPROACH TO VOTING
AS A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT

As previously indicated, the Court does not always identify
which test it uses or why it chooses a particular level of scrutiny
in reviewing limitations on voting rights. Thus, we are left
without a satisfactory framework in which to analyze the validity of state restrictions. The confusion stems from the fact that
the compelling state interest test, in practice, always results in
the invalidation of state restrictions. Yet, this result conflicts
with the view that some restrictions are recognized as necessary
to promote stability in the electoral process.
The proposed test does not deal with the whole spectrum
of equal protection. Rather, the test deals with the issue of
assessing the dimensions of the fundamental right to vote. The
starting point is that this test does not attempt to eliminate the
need for making difficult value judgments on the appropriateness of the restriction by allowing the Court to plug in the
variables and come up with automatic answers. Rather, the
purpose of the test is to suggest a method of intelligently and
systematically discussing questions regarding restrictions on
the franchise. Such an approach would avoid the problem of
bogging the Court down in a discussion of which level of scrutiny to apply.
The proposed test is comprised of four parts. First, the
Court should continue to recognize that it does not sit as a
superlegislature and, therefore, may not always be competent
to deal with some areas involving political participation rights.
Second, the Court should recognize that the state has a legitimate interest in maintaining order in the electoral process and,
consequently, political participation rights cannot be absolute.
Third, the Court should recognize that political participation
rights enjoy a preferred status under the Constitution and such
a status requires the state to demonstrate that the legislative
means substantially further the legislative purpose. Fourth,
even though the state shows that the law is, in fact, doing what
it was designed to do, the Court should use a sliding scale to
determine whether the restriction is appropriate in a democratic society. Thus, the greater the burden on political participation rights, the greater the degree of proof which the state
bears in justifying that restriction.
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The Court's Inability to Deal with Certain Voting Rights
The Court does not have the ability to effectively consider
the validity of all restrictions on political participation rights.
This element of the test is important because it gives the Court
a means of deferring to state legislatures on certain questions
of political participation rights. For example, the Court has
determined that it is not the proper branch of the government
to set the voting age requirement," ' perhaps on the rationale
that such a determination is a sensitive political decision better
left to the state legislatures. Further, in the one man, one vote
area, the Court has decided that it will no longer consider cases
involving apportionment lines for state legislatures where the
variance is below a certain percentage, because of the burden
it places on the court system.86 Obviously, the Court is not the
proper branch to effectively regulate the administration of election machinery, thus deference to the state legislature seems
appropriate in this area.
At the same time, the Court should not retreat from its
responsibility to insure that state legislatures adhere to constitutional standards in regulating the right to vote. 7 While the
Court's decision to intervene in a given problem is a policy
decision, it should be remembered that state legislatures are
notorious for infringing on political participation rights if it is
in their self-interest to do so."
85. See Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 627 (1969).
86. See Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735 (1973).
87. One commentator has criticized this interventionist approach:
The traditional approach under the equal protection clause is that the
task of making such classifications rests with the legislature, with the
judicial role being a limited one, correcting excesses where they occur, but
upholding the legislation as reasonable. In the voter qualification context,
as with equal protection generally, the traditional division of responsibility is eminently reasonable. Unlike the courts, the legislatures have extensive fact-finding machinery at their command. Unlike the courts, the
scope of factual inquiry available to legislators is not limited to the record
in particular litigation. And unlike the courts, legislatures are more reflective of the public will on basic policy matters, because of their periodic answerability to the people.
Lee, Mr. Herbert Spencer and the Bachelor Stockbroker: Kramer v. Union Free School
District No. 15, 15 ARIz. L. REV. 457, 469 (1973).
88. Even though it can be argued that legislators reflect their constituency, it
must be remembered that legislators have the ability to draw their own state district
lines so that their constituency will reflect their own views. This power, no doubt, led
the Court in Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964), to intervene since rural interests
were disproportionately overrepresented and urban populations were grossly
underrepresented.
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PoliticalParticipationRights Are Not Absolute
Political participation rights must be seen as less than
absolute since some restrictions are necessary in order to insure
that the electoral processes will be carried out in an orderly
manner. For example, it is quite clear that in order to insure a
manageable ballot, not every individual who wants to run for
President should be allowed to have his name placed on the
ballot. In this context a requirement that he demonstrate some
measurable support from the body politic9 is reasonable. If the
right to participate in the political selection process were absolute, every voter could have his name placed on the ballot. The
result would be an unmanageable ballot that would hamper
free elections. Similarly, a state law requiring citizens to register to be eligible to vote may be an inconvenience to some, yet
it is recognized as a justifiable restriction on the franchise in
order to assure an orderly electoral process.
It is fairly obvious from the Court's decisions in this area
that a state's restriction on the right to vote will not automatically be struck down merely because the restriction is on a
fundamental right.'" In fact, the Court's unexplained use of the
compelling state interest test in some decisions and its absence
in others demonstrates that some restrictions are not only desirable, but constitutional as well. It would be inexact to suggest that because the Court has used the compelling state interest test to invalidate some state restrictions, that political
participation rights are absolute.' However, with one exception,"2 whenever the Court does employ the compelling state
89. See Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724 (1974); American Party of Texas v. White,
415 U.S. 767 (1974).
90. See note 29 supra.
91. See Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724 (1974).
92. The one exception to this rule appears in Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724
(1974), where the Court, using the compelling state interest test, upheld a California
statute which denied ballot access to independent candidates who had not met the one
year disaffiliation with a political party requirement. Mr. Justice White speaking for
the Court said,
It appears obvious to us that the one-year disaffiliation provision furthers
the State's interest in the stability of its political system. We also consider that interest as not only permissible, but compelling and as outweighing the interest the candidate and his supporters may have in making a later rather than an early decision to seek independent ballot status.
Id. at 736. Mr. Justice Brennan, dissenting, accepted the identification of California's
compelling state interests with respect to political stability, but argued that the state
had not demonstrated the absence of reasonably less burdensome means of achieving
its objectives. Id. at 760-61.
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interest test, the state law is always voided. 3
The proposed test recognizes at the outset that voting
rights are not absolute, thus clearing the way for an application
of a more flexible analysis.
Application of the Means-Focus Test
The third part of this analysis focuses on the level of scrutiny which the Court should apply. Under the traditional rational relationship test, the state's burden of justifying a regulation or classification would require only a showing that it bore
some rational relationship to a legitimate state purpose. Such
an approach has nearly always resulted in the Court upholding
the state law. In fact, the state's burden in demonstrating a
rational relationship is usually de minimus once this test is
invoked since the Court has shown complete deference to the
legislature. On the other hand, application of the compelling
state interest test would seem unsatisfactory in analyzing the
dimensions of a fundamental right because the use of that standard has always resulted in voiding the state's classification.
What this phase of the proposed test purports to do is to
force the state to demonstrate that the law accomplishes what
it was, in fact, set up to do before the Court attempts to assess
the appropriateness of the state's purpose. The reason for this
higher level of scrutiny is that political participation rights,
having already been declared fundamental by the Court,
should enjoy a preferred or favored status in the Constitution.
Professor Gunther has described an inquiry of this nature
as a means-focus test: i.e., that the legislative means must
substantially further the legislative ends or purpose:
Stated most simply, it would have the Court take seriously
a constitutional requirement that has never been formally
abandoned: That legislative means must substantially further legislative ends .

. .

. Moreover, it would have the

Justices gauge the reasonableness of the questionable
93. In McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961), the Court outlined the rational relationship test this way:
The constitutional safeguard is offended only if the classification rests on
grounds wholly irrelevant to the achievement of the State's objective.
State legislatures are presumed to have acted within their constitutional
power despite the fact that, in practice, their laws result in some inequality. A statutory discrimination will not be set aside if any state of facts
reasonably may be conceived to justify it.
Id. at 425-26.
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means on the basis of materials that are offered to the
Court rather than resorting to rationalizations created by
perfunctory judicial hypothesizing."

Although this proposed test goes beyond the Gunther
model and also concerns itself with the appropriatenessof the
legislative ends, this initial inquiry, while not free from conceptual difficulties, 5 would be helpful in defining the issues. Additionally, the state would bear the burden of explaining what
the law is trying to accomplish. The problem with ending the
analysis here, as the Gunther model has, and limiting our concerns solely to whether the means substantially further the
ends, is that those ends (purposes) may be impermissible in a
democratic society." Furthermore, an objective inquiry into
the legislature's intent in enacting a law presents a further
problem in that each Justice's subjective value preferences
would undoubtedly influence the direction of such an analysis.
However, a means-focus test is used as one of the elements in
assessing the validity of a restriction because if the law does not
accomplish what the legislature intended, then the state's burden in justifying the restriction should increase."
94. Gunther, supra note 18, at 20-21. For a discussion of the theoretical framework of a means-focus test see Comment, A Case Study in Equal Protection: Voting
Rights Decisions and a Plea for Consistency, 70 Nw. U.L. REV. 934, 957-64 (1976).
95. Professor Gunther acknowledged that one of the difficulties in applying the
model would be to avoid a disguised examination of the appropriateness of the legislative ends. Gunther, supra note 18, at 48. However, suppose the legislature enacts a law
which permits only leaseholders and property owners to vote in a bond election on the
ground that they are the ones who would be paying the increased taxes. Obviously,
the means substantially further the legislative purposes since those who don't fall into
either of the two categories are prohibited from voting. The real question is whether
the purpose (ends) is a permissible one under the Constitution.
96. One commentator has noted some misgivings about the Gunther model:
We are therefore left with a test which cannot be meaningfully applied
because it presumes to evaluate a logical relationship which in fact is not
the basis of the constitutional infringement. . . . Yet, fundamentally it
is not the hoped for benefit or harm of a particular legislative act or even
the causal connection between the legislative purpose and the act itself,
but rather the actual effect of the act that is potentially unconstitutional.
Whether the legislature is capricious in its reasoning or totally logical in
its action is really not for judicial inquiry, but rather it is for the Court
to determine if a class of individuals has in fact been unconstitutionally
harmed by the classification drawn.
Comment, The Mandatefor a New Equal Protection Model, 24 CATH. L. REV. 558, 56566 (1975) (emphasis in original).
97. An example of how the means-focus test might work in right to vote cases
was illustrated in Hill v. Stone, 421 U.S. 289 (1975). In Hill, the Court struck down a
Texas voting procedure whereby all persons owning taxable property voted in one box
in local bond elections and all other registered voters cast their ballots in a separate
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A Subjective Analysis of the Statute's Appropriateness
The fourth part of this test would have the Court subjectively analyze the constitutional appropriateness of any restriction on the right to vote. As the burden on the right to vote
increases, the justification for that burden must correspondingly increase in order for it to be constitutionally valid." The
value of a flexible test is that the Court is not left having to
decide whether to use the compelling state interest test, the
rational relationship test, or refuse to explain how it reached
the result it did. As previously mentioned, political participation rights are not absolute, and consequently, any test which
attempts to analyze this right must reflect the fact that certain
restrictions will be upheld, while others will not. The Court's
current approach in the area is hardly a model of rationality
and tends to confuse the real issue in the case which is the
appropriateness of the restriction.
The applicaton of such a sliding scale approach will not
box, with the bond issue deemed to have been passed only if it was approved by a
majority vote in the renderers' box and in the aggregate of both boxes. Id. at 292. The
state contended that the use of such a system encouraged prospective property owners
to account for their property and thereby helped enforce the State's tax laws. Id. at
298-99. Mr. Justice Marshall responded to the state's contention:
It seems particularly dubious here, since under the State's construction
of the rendering requirement, an individual will be given the right to vote,
if he renders any property at all no matter how trivial. Those rendering
solely to earn the right to vote in bond elections may well render property
of minimal value, in order to qualify for voting without imposing upon
themselves a substantial tax liability. The rendering requirement thus
seems unlikely to have any significant impact on the asserted state policy
of encouraging each person to render all of his property.
Id. at 299-300 (emphasis added). In other words, the legislative means did not substantially further the legislative ends.
98. Professor Wilkinson, in a recent thought-provoking article on equal protection, has framed a test for analyzing political participation rights in the following way:
"The Court may thus begin an analysis of state election law by asking, simply and
straightforwardly, whether a significant measure of political equality has been denied.
If it has, the practical inquiry must be whether judicial standards of sufficient coherence and specificty exist to remedy the problem." Wilkinson, The Supreme Court, the
Equal Protection Clause, and the Three Faces of Constitutional Equality, 61 U. VA.
L. REV. 945, 976 (1975). It is not clear whether the Wilkinson test would include the
means-focus test as a method of evaluation. The test proposed in this comment does
not start out with the concept of political equality, but rather, includes the meansfocus scrutiny at the outset as a way of allocating the burden of proof and establishing
the state's purpose in enacting the law. Practically speaking, the Wilkinson test and
the test proposed herein may not differ in substance. However, the proposed test has
been framed in current equal protection language in the hope that the Court may find
this conceptually easier to adopt as opposed to merely dealing with the broad notion
of political equality.
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automatically dictate the result in a case. In fact, the ultimate
resolution of the matter may depend upon who is sitting on the
Court at the time of the decision. But at least by using a sliding
scale, the debate will focus on the necessity for such a burden
rather than debating which level of scrutiny to apply.
How the Proposed Test Would Work
An example of the test's implementation would be useful.
In Rosario v. Rockefeller the voter was required to enroll in the
party of his choice at least thirty days before the November
general election in order to be eligible to vote in New York's
next primary (held in June) and eleven months prior to a nonpresidential primary (held in September)." Using the more
flexible approach to voting rights, the case might be viewed
this way: First, this is not an area where the Court lacks an
ability to effectively evaluate restrictions on the franchise since
the evaluation of the burden seems very straightforward. Second, since the right to vote is not absolute, the state has the
option of enacting laws restricting the franchise, especially here
in order to prevent the voters of one party from voting in the
primary of another party. Third, the means-focus test asks the
question, do the legislative means (the legislation itself) substantially further the legislative ends (the legislative purposes)? Here the purpose of the state restriction is to prevent
party raiding by imposing strict time limitations on declaring
one's party affiliation. While the restriction may be burdensome, the means do substantially further the ends since voters
are required to make a choice of party affiliation well before the
thought of crossing over to the other party and voting for the
weaker candidate becomes politically realistic. 9' Fourth, the
last question, and the most crucial element, is the appropriateness of the restriction. While all may agree that the state of
New York has a legitimate goal of limiting party raiding, the
timing of such a restriction becomes the real issue. At this point
the Justices will have to make a subjective value judgment as
to whether this constitutionally guaranteed right can be burdened by this restriction. The answer cannot be gleaned from
any model, but rather must be argued on the basis of a policy
decision as to whether the increased state burden on the franchise can be correspondingly justified by the state's desire to
99. 410 U.S. 752, 760 (1973).
99.1. Although this restriction might be invalidated as overinclusive, such a
statistical determination may prove difficult. See generally Craig v. Boren, 97 S. Ct.
451, 460 (1976).
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prevent party raiding. 0 Obviously, such an approach will not
satisfy those who desire simple formulas, but at least by using
this framework, the issue of appropriateness will not be obscured by a debate as to which level of scrutiny to apply.
Chances for Implementation of the Proposed Test
Whether or not the Court will articulate a new right to vote
test along the lines suggested is not clear. Even if the Court
refuses to adopt a more flexible test for determining what is a
''suspect classification" or a "fundamental right," the Court
must still deal with the appropriateness of a restriction on a
right that has already been declared fundamental. Although
the Court-still formally adheres to the two tier test,'"' the reality of the matter is that the Court seems to be analyzing the
propriety of the burden on a case by case basis.
The Court has maintained this degree of flexibility in
every category of political participation rights by using a level
of scrutiny which will bring the Court to its desired result. For
example, in the area of state legislative redistricting (one man,
one vote), the Court applies a less strict standard of review
than it applies to congressional district lines. The Court tells
us when examining the constitutionality of state legislative
02
boundary lines, that it is using the rational relationship test.
However, such a test in the past has nearly always resulted in
upholding the state's classification and since the Court has not
hesitated in this area to strike down variances it deems significant, it is clear that a stricter standard of review is being
used. 10 3 In the area of providing greater voter access to the
ballot box, the Court uses the two standards depending upon
the result it wishes to reach. This situation is evidenced by the
Rosario and Kusper decisions where the Court used different
tests to decide the validity of restrictions to prevent raiding in
party primaries.104 Likewise, in assessing independent and
100. Five Justices thought the time deadline was a minimal infringement since
the law did not prohibit voters from voting but only imposed a time limitation on their
enrollment. Id. at 753-62. Four Justices felt that the state's interest in preventing party
raiding was not substantial enough to enact such a lengthy time deadline since it
assumed a willingness to manipulate the system which was not likely to be widespread.
Id. at 769 (Powell, J., dissenting).
101. Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 96 S.Ct. 2562 (1976); San
Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973). See generally Craig
v. Boren, 97 S. Ct. 451, 463-64 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring).
102. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
103. See text accompanying note 45 supra.
104. See text accompanying note 70 supra.
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third party candidate access to the ballot, the Court in Lubin
v. Panish invalidated by means of the rational relationship test
a California statute which effectively denied indigents access
to the ballot because they were unable to pay the necessary
filing fees.'" 5 However, using the traditional rational
relationship approach in Lubin the Court could have found a
basis for the law by noting the state's desire to limit ballot size
and to have the candidates pay some of the election's administrative costs."" It is apparent in Lubin that the Court was
employing some type of sliding scale in deciding the validity
of the restriction.
Whether the Court will expressly label its evaluation of
political participation rights as one of a sliding scale remains
to be seen. Mr. Justice Marshall, dissenting in San Antonio
Independent School District v. Rodriguez, proposed using a
sliding scale for determining the extent to which interests not
specifically mentioned in the Constitution are deemed fundamental.'" 7 The thrust of the Marshall argument was that as the
nexus between specific constitutional guarantees and the nonconstitutional guarantee became closer, the nonconstitutional
interest became more fundamental and the standard of scrutiny adjusted accordingly.'"' Yet, the majority in Rodriguez
rejected Marshall's sliding scale approach when it declared
that education was not a fundamental right under the Federal
Constitution. °0 Perhaps one way which the Court could adopt
the sliding scale approach for analyzing political participation
rights consistent with Rodriguez is to note the difference between analyzing whether a right should be declared fundamental and passing on the consitutional validity of a restriction on
a right already declared fundamental. In the former, the analysis is directed to an inquiry of whether that interest is explicitly
or implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution.1 0 In the latter
situation, the Court is dealing with a declared fundamental
right and assessing whether state restrictions pass constitu105. 415 U.S. 709 (1974).
106. One commentator has noted that this manipulative power reflects the
fact
that the rationality test is an "empty requirement and a misleading analytical
device."
Note, Legislative Purpose, Rationality, and Equal Protection, 82 YALE L.J.
123, 128
(1972).
107. 411 U.S. 1, 70 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting). See generally Massachusetts
Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 96 S.Ct. 2562, 2568 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
108. 411 U.S. at 102-03 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
109. 411 U.S. at 35.
"110. Id. at 33-34.
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tional muster. Thus, the Court's decision in Rodriguez has not
foreclosed it from using a sliding scale approach for political
participation rights.
A flexible approach to political participation rights could
be a beginning to a search for a more viable overall equal protection standard. Even if the Court does not articulate the
proposed test as such, it is helpful in analyzing the problems
that the Court faces and its response to those issues.
CONCLUSION

The Court's current approach in analyzing the constitutionality of restrictions on political participation rights is at
best uneven and is unsatisfactory due to a lack of judicial consistency. The problem stems from the fact that the Court uses
the compelling state interest test in some situations and the
rational relationship test in other circumstances without giving
a clear explanation as to when a particular standard of review
should be used. A more flexible approach to the question of
political participation rights is in order. The new proposed test
using a sliding scale would appear to be a more realistic mode
of analyzing the difficult question of whether or not the restriction is appropriate in a democratic society. This test does not
provide automatic answers to the issues before the Court, but
does provide a framework within which the answers to these
complex constitutional problems will not appear so mysterious.
Robert F. Wall

